Introduction
As the Middle East moved through the closing days of August 2026, the region entered a phase that can fairly be described as an end to large-scale fighting without completed political settlements. Across the main theaters—from the contest over the Strait of Hormuz to Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—diplomacy has intensified and military activity has been reduced or contained by fragile ceasefires and partial understandings. None of these tracks has yet produced stable, self-enforcing arrangements. In each case the talks have narrowed to a single, stubborn question of sequencing and trust: who must implement its core commitments first, and what guarantees will ensure the other side actually complies.
In the Strait of Hormuz, Iran and Oman have moved closer to a temporary arrangement that would allow part of maritime traffic to resume through corridors passing through Iranian and Omani waters. Tehran, however, links the full reopening of the strait to a set of conditions involving the United States, including lifting the naval blockade and sanctions, compensation, and an end to attacks. Iranian officials said on 27 August that an understanding had been reached with Oman over a shipping corridor, although final details and some implementation conditions remained under negotiation. Washington, for its part, continues to reject any formula that would grant Iran unilateral control over the strait.
In Lebanon, negotiations have moved beyond a ceasefire alone toward linking Israeli withdrawal to the disarmament of Hezbollah and third-party verification. A US-facilitated round of negotiations between Lebanon and Israel began in Rome in early August, producing a shortlist of countries that could participate in verifying disarmament. Hezbollah, however, is not a party to the agreement and rejects relinquishing its weapons, while Israel insists that it will not withdraw before the process is completed. Israeli strikes and violations have continued in parallel; UNIFIL recorded 455 Israeli projectiles directed toward southern Lebanon and 97 violations of Lebanese airspace during a single weekend in August.
In Syria, a Syrian-Israeli security meeting mediated by the United States and hosted by Jordan on 23 August reopened the de-escalation track after talks had been suspended during the war with Iran. Damascus demanded an end to Israeli attacks, withdrawal to positions held before the developments of 2024, and restoration of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. Washington, meanwhile, is seeking a security arrangement that prevents direct friction and keeps Syria from becoming an arena for Israeli-Turkish rivalry. Following the meeting, Jordan reiterated its rejection of Israeli attacks and its support for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In Gaza, the “Board of Peace” is no longer merely a theoretical political framework. Institutions, plans, and resources have been established to implement the initiative, but implementation has again encountered the question of sequencing. The US July plan is based on Hamas’s disarmament in parallel with a gradual Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of an international stabilization force, and a Palestinian technocratic administration. Israel now insists on complete disarmament before withdrawal, whereas Hamas maintains that the process must proceed in stages. Israeli strikes have continued despite the ceasefire. On 30 August, two Palestinians were killed in Deir al-Balah, including a three-year-old child. Israel says it is responding to security threats, while Hamas accuses Israel of violating the agreement and obstructing its implementation.
Strategic assessment: the region is not necessarily moving toward a new comprehensive war, but neither has it entered a phase of peace. What is emerging is a conditional and asymmetrical truce system in which military and political actors use periods of calm to improve their positions before moving to the next stage.
The Strait of Hormuz and Iran — Negotiating a Corridor Does Not Mean Resolving the Conflict
The Iranian-Omani track has achieved the clearest progress when compared with the US-Iranian track. The formula under discussion revolves around a temporary shipping corridor and agreed transit routes, accompanied by arrangements for mine clearance and maritime security. The preliminary understanding would permit vessels to pass through areas of Iranian and Omani waters, but Iran distinguishes between opening a limited corridor and fully reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
By contrast, US-Iranian negotiations have effectively reached a state of deadlock. Iran announced in early August that no direct negotiations with Washington were under way and later said that it had not decided to resume them. The memorandum of understanding brokered by Pakistan on 17 June expired in mid-August without becoming a permanent agreement, following disputes over transit routes in Hormuz and the resumption of reciprocal strikes.
From Tehran’s perspective, Hormuz has become a negotiating lever that links the maritime file to the war, sanctions, frozen assets, and compensation. From Washington’s perspective, accepting such linkage would amount to implicit recognition of Iran’s ability to use freedom of navigation as a bargaining instrument. Oman may therefore be able to resolve the technical problem of a shipping corridor, but it cannot by itself resolve the underlying US-Iranian political dispute.
In the short term, the more likely outcome is limited and monitored operation of some shipping lanes rather than a full return to the pre-war situation. Tehran is likely to retain Hormuz as leverage until it receives tangible political and economic concessions, while Washington will seek to separate maritime security from Iran’s other negotiating files.
Lebanon — The “Weapons-for-Withdrawal” Dilemma
The Lebanese arena is the most politically complex because any external agreement directly intersects with Lebanon’s internal balance of power. The US-sponsored understanding links a gradual Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon to Hezbollah’s disarmament and verification by an international body or selected states. Lebanon and Israel have already reached an initial list of countries that could participate in the verification process, with the final selection remaining with the United States.
The central obstacle, however, remains unchanged. Hezbollah is not a direct party to the agreement and rejects disarmament, while Israel has hardened its position and declared that it will not withdraw from the “security zone” before Hezbollah is disarmed. After Israeli statements suggested the possibility of a prolonged presence in southern Lebanon, Washington criticized that direction, prompting Israel to return to the formula linking withdrawal to disarmament.
The deeper problem is the absence of trust in simultaneous implementation. The Lebanese side and Hezbollah fear that the group could surrender its weapons or lose its deterrent capability while Israel remains inside Lebanese territory and continues its strikes. Israel, by contrast, argues that withdrawing before verified disarmament would recreate the threat along its northern border.
This is not simply a technical problem that can be resolved by international observers. It is a problem of sequencing and guarantees: does withdrawal begin first? Does disarmament begin first? Or do both proceed simultaneously under verification?
Any viable formula will require simultaneous measures implemented in geographically defined stages: an Israeli withdrawal from a specified area matched by the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces and verification of the absence of non-state weapons there, followed by movement to the next area. Requiring either side to complete all its obligations before the other begins would increase the likelihood of negotiations collapsing.
Syria and the Amman Security Meeting — Jordan as a Platform for De-escalation
The meeting hosted by Jordan on 23 August is significant because it restored Syrian-Israeli contact after talks were suspended during the war with Iran, and because it followed new Israeli strikes on the Abu al-Duhur military airbase in Idlib. Jordan officially stated that the meeting was held at Syria’s request to discuss de-escalation, while reiterating its condemnation of Israeli strikes, calling for withdrawal from Syrian territory, and stressing respect for the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.
Syria’s demands in the talks are relatively clear: an end to attacks, Israel’s return to the lines preceding the developments that followed 2024, and restoration of the 1974 agreement, while rejecting permanent restrictions on rebuilding Syrian military capabilities or on Damascus’s regional choices. At the same time, Damascus considers discussion of the final status of the Golan Heights premature, while continuing to assert Syrian sovereignty over the territory.
Jordan’s interest is direct. Continued instability and tension in southern Syria threaten Jordan’s borders, increase opportunities for smuggling and armed-group activity, and turn southern Syria into an arena of competition among Israel, Türkiye, and other actors. Jordan is therefore acting not as a mediator for a final peace settlement, but as a geographic stabilization intermediary seeking to prevent escalation from spilling toward its borders.
The Amman security meeting does not constitute a final political breakthrough, but it opens a channel that could support a limited security arrangement. The most realistic scenario is not a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty in the near term, but security arrangements that restore elements of the logic of the 1974 agreement and reduce military friction.
Gaza and the Board of Peace — The Contest Has Shifted from Ending the War to Shaping the “Day After”
In Gaza, the center of the conflict has shifted from the ceasefire itself to the conditions governing the next phase. Trump’s 15-point plan, announced on 30 July, is built around an interconnected process: the disarmament of Hamas, a gradual Israeli withdrawal, an international stabilization force, a new Palestinian police force, and a technocratic civilian administration.
The problem is that Israel has reinterpreted the sequencing in its favor and is now effectively demanding that disarmament precede any substantial withdrawal, whereas the original formula linked gradual withdrawal to verified progress on disarmament. An official with the Board of Peace confirmed that the plan remains in place and that progress will depend on field verification of commitments.
This development reflects the same crisis of trust seen in Lebanon, but in a more acute form. Hamas argues that relinquishing its weapons without an Israeli withdrawal and enforceable guarantees could turn disarmament into an unconditional surrender with uncertain consequences. Israel, by contrast, argues that withdrawal before disarmament could allow Hamas to rebuild its military capabilities.
Continued Israeli strikes deepen the crisis of confidence. Nikolay Mladenov, the official responsible for implementing the initiative, criticized the continuation of Israeli operations and warned that they threaten the plan, while Israel says it is responding to security risks or ceasefire violations.
The Board of Peace, meanwhile, now has institutions, resources, and implementation plans, according to its report to the UN Security Council. Yet a full transition to the next phase remains dependent on decisions by the parties, the disarmament issue, and the transition to civilian administration.
The greatest risk is not necessarily a sudden collapse of the ceasefire, but its transformation into a permanent ceasefire without a settlement: Israel could remain militarily present across substantial parts of Gaza, Hamas could remain partially armed, and reconstruction and transitional governance could be delayed.
Israel and the Far Right — Securing Conditions Before Offering Concessions
A common pattern emerges from Israeli conduct in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria: an effort to convert the results of military force into political preconditions. In Gaza, this means Hamas’s disarmament before withdrawal; in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s disarmament before withdrawal; and in Syria, an attempt to preserve the widest possible freedom of military action until satisfactory security arrangements are reached.
This is an analytical conclusion, not a single formal statement of Israeli policy. It is, however, consistent with public positions expressed by Netanyahu and the Israeli defense minister regarding Gaza and Lebanon.
For the Israeli right, the advantage is that ending a war need not mean relinquishing its gains. Yet this approach contains an internal contradiction: the longer occupation continues, or strikes persist after a ceasefire, the less willing the opposing side becomes to surrender its instruments of power. The Israeli demand for disarmament therefore becomes more difficult, not less.
This is where the crisis of guarantors becomes apparent. Arab, Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian actors are asking not only, “Will Israel comply?” but also whether Washington, the Board of Peace, or the United Nations can compel Israel to implement its obligations if it refuses. This remains the unresolved gap across all the negotiating tracks.
Scenarios for the Coming Weeks
Most likely scenario — managing crises rather than resolving them: a partial reopening of Hormuz, continued Omani mediation, continued Lebanese-Israeli negotiations without resolution of Hezbollah’s weapons, limited progress in Syrian-Israeli security arrangements, and the Gaza plan remaining in place while the sequencing of disarmament and withdrawal remains stalled. This scenario has the highest probability.
Gradual improvement scenario: an implementation agreement on Hormuz, followed by the resumption of US-Iranian channels, alongside a phased agreement in Lebanon, an initial security arrangement in Syria, and the beginning of deployment of the stabilization force in Gaza. This scenario would require balanced US pressure on all parties, including Israel.
Setback scenario: the collapse of one of the ceasefire tracks, particularly in Lebanon or Gaza, or a major incident in Hormuz that reconnects the fronts. In that case, the danger is that the current truces could shift from instruments of de-escalation into periods for repositioning and preparation for another round.
Latest Developments
Several fronts have witnessed new developments. The United States resumed limited military strikes against Iranian targets after approximately one month of relative calm. US military authorities said the strikes were a response to attempts to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded by launching missiles toward US positions in Jordan, which were intercepted. Two oil tankers carrying Saudi cargoes were also attacked while exiting the strait, with no reliably confirmed claim of responsibility at the time. In parallel, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Tehran was prepared to return immediately to the commitments contained in the June memorandum of understanding if Washington returned to its own commitments, linking guarantees for freedom of navigation in Hormuz to implementation of the agreement.
In Lebanon, the European Union’s foreign policy chief announced that more than ten European countries were prepared to contribute to a European mission to train and support the Lebanese Armed Forces. The stated objective is to enable the Lebanese state to assume broader security responsibilities and support the Hezbollah disarmament track associated with ceasefire arrangements. Planning envisages establishing the mission by mid-October, although it does not constitute a new Lebanese-Israeli agreement and is not an immediate replacement for UNIFIL.
In Gaza, Israel carried out an operation in Gaza City that it said was intended to detain a Hamas security official. The operation was accompanied by airstrikes that killed at least five people. Hamas described the operation as a violation of the ceasefire. There is, so far, no reliable indication of a new negotiating breakthrough or a change in the terms of the settlement, but the incident places additional pressure on the sustainability of the truce.
In Syria, no comparable new negotiating shift has emerged. The latest major strategic development remains the formal dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the beginning of their integration into state institutions on 25 August.
The most consequential shift is the combination of renewed military confrontation around Hormuz with an open, but conditional, path back to negotiations. The track has therefore moved from negotiating deadlock toward a phase of “military pressure coupled with a conditional offer to return to an agreement.” In Lebanon, the European initiative points to a gradual transition from mediation alone toward the construction of executable security arrangements centered on the Lebanese Armed Forces, although it has not yet reached the level of a final political settlement.
Conclusion
The current regional landscape is not suffering from a shortage of initiatives, but from a shortage of reciprocal guarantees and implementation mechanisms. Nearly all parties accept the principle of negotiation, yet each wants to retain its instruments of leverage until it is certain that the other side will implement its commitments. This is the central paradox: demands for the disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah may form part of any future security settlement, but they become exceedingly difficult to implement if full disarmament is required before Israeli withdrawal, an end to strikes, and enforceable international guarantees. Conversely, a complete Israeli withdrawal without security arrangements and mutual verification is difficult to sell politically inside Israel.
The key to breaking the impasse is therefore not determining who moves first, but shifting toward a model of simultaneous, phased, and verifiable implementation: step for step, area for area, and disarmament matched by withdrawal, under third-party monitoring equipped with a clear mechanism to document violations and impose political costs on the party that fails to comply.
For Jordan, the Syrian-Israeli meeting in Amman demonstrates the possibility of its role evolving from that of a state affected by surrounding crises into a regional platform for containing escalation and arranging security understandings, particularly on the Syrian file. This serves a direct Jordanian interest: preventing the northern and western borders from becoming an open extension of conflicts involving Israel, Iran and its proxies, or Israeli-Turkish competition.
The overall conclusion is that the region faces a genuine but fragile window for de-escalation. If the current truces are not converted into reciprocal and guaranteed commitments in the coming months, the “post-war phase” is likely to become little more than an interval between wars.
