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Sisyphus Dilemma of the International System or Looking at Syria through the Events in Rwanda and Bosnia

Prof Dr Altan Çetin by Prof Dr Altan Çetin
08 May 2023
in Politics, Strategy
Reading Time: 16 mins read
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Sisyphus Dilemma of the International System or Looking at Syria through the Events in Rwanda and Bosnia
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From Rwanda to Syria

What has been happening in Syria in recent years is one of the most high-scale acts of violence humanity has seen in recent times. A state and its coalition partners are trying to destroy the opposition by displaying the ugliest forms of warfare. A tragedy is unfolding in this country where compassion and conscience cannot even remain silent. This process, which is taking place in front of the eyes of the free world and despite the so-called support of the opposition, brings to mind the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. You know, what happened in this country in the middle of Africa while the genocide in Bosnia was going on. The unthinkable event in which 800 thousand people were destroyed in 100 days.

When we think about Rwanda these days, interesting structural similarities with what is happening in Syria can draw attention. I can almost hear those who read this article at this point saying, “No way! Just as the Syrian tragedy is part of Afghanistan and part of Bosnia, it is also part of Rwanda on a structural level.

Rwanda is a country that was colonised first by Germany at the Brussels Conference in 1890 and then by Belgium after the First World War. The first leg of our analogy starts right here. The same structure that shared Africa with a great appetite also piled into the Middle East with the same greed after the Ottoman Empire.

The colonial period is the common destiny of both Africa and the Middle East. Although the Ottoman Empire’s shielding of both regions repelled the previous attempts, colonial structures were established in these regions after fate had consigned it to its destined end. This meant the beginning of chaos and instability within these structures.

France in Syria and Belgium in Rwanda operated in these countries with a similar political mind and conscience. It would not be wrong to say that the road stones of the massacre in 1994 and today were laid in these periods. The technological positivist mind of the West, adjusted to calculation and benefit has shaped the region with the cold-blood of a machine. While all this was happening, history stopped in Africa and the Middle East. Both geographies were out of history and history flowed as an object in the river.

 

This period was also a time when the foundations of polarisation in these countries were laid, of breaking away from historical unifiers, of inventing others, of starting categorisations and looking at the other with hatred. History is no longer functional and constructive, but destructive in these processes. The human being loses its value, the will to be a nation and walk together to the future weakens and the homeland becomes relative to others. Security concerns take precedence over respect, compassion and service to one’s own country.

 

Africa and the Middle East in general, Syria and Rwanda in particular are now experiencing the fate of being reduced to the position of a sleeping country, and are turning into the field of strategic and political economy. The inhabitants became meaningful or meaningless in line with the realisation of the goals rather than human beings.

It is precisely here that another governing strategy of the Western mind will come into play. This is the preference to rule the majority with minority groups in the colonised country. This is both more costless and easier. Because the minority will be subject to the external ruler who controls the region. This preference was formed with a theme and content that varied according to the situation at ethnic, religious and tribal level.

When we look at this point, in contrast to the French mind that preferred a Nusayrism group in Syria, Tutsis were preferred in Belgium during the colonial period. With these expressions, neither the Nusayrism nor the Tutsis are criticised, but the situation is determined in terms of determining the functioning mind. These preferences inevitably created an exclusion from other segments of the society and a structure that was open to provocation in the later stages. In Rwanda, the particular mind, which changed its preference with the changing balances of the Second World War, started to prefer the majority Hutu this time. Because when it came to the ballot box, this was important and necessary in order to exist in that country. It was unthinkable that a conflict would not emerge from this structure polarised by years and it did. A similar process took place in Syria in a different context and the power of the minority lasted until the last uprising. The status quo here is not as simple and easy as in Africa.

 

The importance and value of the region was of course different. In any case, social division and polarisation were laid as another road stone of the conflict in these two countries in their own autonomous processes. Poverty, ignorance and confusion seemed to be the common destiny of these societies. While global structures recruiting local elements were realising their own strategies, a politics of tutelage was going on within the country.

Therefore, massacre, conflict and tension were inevitable. The massacres of the Hutus against the Tutsis in 1964 and 1974, the hundreds of thousands fleeing the country and the 1994 massacre at the end of the civil war that continued between 1990 and 92 have passed as a dark page in the history of the country. Today, a civil war continues in Syria accompanied by exile and torture and continues with all its intensity in these days when the Geneva-2 conference is being held. In short, as can be seen, these geographies, where the tactic of ruling the majority by polarising and using the minority turns into violence, are painful examples of the policies of the same mind with different nuances.

The worst and cruellest thing is the time it will take to rehabilitate the walls of anger, hatred and blood sown between brothers and sisters. But what does it matter, former French President François Mitterrand’s statement to Le Figaro in 1998, “It is not  important that a genocide took place in those countries.” seems to summarise the story.

Another aspect of the issue is the approach of UN-centred actors such as the USA and France to the issue while the events were taking place. While the massacre and genocide was going on in Rwanda, for some reason the USA withdrew its UN troops from the region. France, which remained silent until the intervention of the Rwanda Patriotic Union, suddenly intervened in the region and turned a blind eye to the slaughter of 200 thousand people under its supervision. Today, in the Syrian conflict, the UN is silent and is just wandering around the issue. The direct or indirect interventions of the US, which could have ended the issue long ago are not on the horizon. On the ground, forces such as the PYD and ISIS have declared that they will not recognise any treaty and continue to fight together with other Iranian-backed forces. The terrorist rhetoric, which the trio of Russia, Iran and Syria tried and emphasised in Geneva-2, is a case of the hat falling off and the bald head appearing.

 

While labelling a group that strengthens their hands at the table with terrorism and presenting it in front of the world, on the other hand, the terror of torture is not mentioned. With a complete eclipse of conscience, they go around the issue by making statements about the timing or health of the photographs, and they continue their reckless behaviour by taking advantage of the US’s stance within the framework of the strategy they have reached with possible secret agreements. Yes, it would be naive to think that the conscience of humanity, which did not bleed in Bosnia and Rwanda yesterday, will bleed in Syria today.

 

In Syria today, a massacre is going on with weapons from Russia equivalent to the murders in Rwanda yesterday with cleavers from China. Syria is going to the polls together and as one is the biggest concern of the regime and these forces. The forces looking at Syria with the lessons they have learnt from Egypt are endeavouring to solve the issue in this parallel. The violence and blood reflected to the world from Bosnia, Khojaly and Rwanda yesterday is reflected from Iraq and Syria today.

However, as it is tried to be shown to some extent, the founding beginning and continuation of these processes originate from dynamics and processes outside the dynamics of the region.

There is no great central power to intervene in the colonial and post-colonial experiences, the unstable emancipations of the post-World War II period and the post-Cold War jostling today. The Middle East, polarised by forces that can be controlled from within and outside the region, is today far from reaching the strategic integration of the Seljuk-Ottoman line. Akif said about the turmoil caused by the civilisation that centralises power and interest in our region: “The blood of politics: wealth, life, might, Cruel Europe recognises a right: strength.” His words are an important testimony of what happened.

In Rwanda, according to one interpretation, these explanations which are interpreted as the apparent cause of the massacres centred on the Rwandans of the Tutsis and the struggle over fertile lands, remain details in the final analysis, even if they are true when looking at the whole picture. In Syria, on the other hand, a conflict centred on sectarianism and religion is portrayed. In the region, the struggle between a regime that guarantees secularism and the forces against it is shown. As can be understood, all these are the theatrical parts of the issue and do nothing but fuel the fire in the field.

 

Yesterday in Rwanda, insects were cleansed with cleavers; today in Syria, terrorists!!! are being destroyed by torture. The last response of our foreign affairs, which established the highest level and good relations with the Assad administration in the history of Turkey-Syria, was that we are hosting 700 thousand terrorists in Turkey.

Today, Rwanda is trying to build its future with the motto of remembering the past as beneficial for the future, unification and renewal. It is hoped that the internal peace and reconciliation achieved in the country will not be torn apart by new interventions. Syria, on the other hand, is a country whose future is on the table today.

The Russia-Iran-Syria trio is trying to steer the issue in the direction they want through the terrorist discourse and ISIS, to gain time by playing on the fears of Islamophobia, which Rouhani did in Davos, which was really exemplary and to finalise the process in Syria in a direction that Turkey does not desire.

At this point, the US-Russia and Turkey-Iran negotiations are important. It is also necessary to state that with the recent processes, there is no serious army left in the region to threaten Israel, and there is no structure other than Iran that will pose a threat in the medium term.

 

No matter how depressing the view and the picture, dramatic breaks in the judgement of time are always the case and hope is the main element that carries life. In the words of Akif, “To give up determination by seeing the future darkness. If there is a low death, I am sure this is the only one.”

 

This attempt to analyse Rwanda and Syria is certainly not a one-to-one mapping. However, historical events originating from similar origins can show similar processes with different nuances. What happened today is the evidence of what happened yesterday and what will happen tomorrow.

It is hoped that Syria will not become Bosnia, Afghanistan and Rwanda!!! However, the nature of the international system and the dynamics in the region do not allow for a very optimistic outlook. A conscience and compassion that will extend a hand to the suffering of simple Syrians in the network of terror and fears seems to be entrusted to an unknown future.

 

Bosnia to Syria

The aftershocks of the collapse of the Soviet Union continue to be experienced in our region. The first serious echo of this event was in the Balkans. Bosnia was shaken by a war overshadowed by tragic crimes against humanity and genocide between 1992 and 1995, of course, we were also shaken. Today, we are witnessing a similar drama in Syria during the days of the Arab Spring, which we think is a continuation of these events.

 

The geopolitical situation of Syria resembles Bosnia in that it is deprived of underground riches just like Bosnia, but due to its important strategic location. Although the processes started with different dynamics and there are changes in the nature, one cannot help but look at the events as close as yesterday while evaluating their behaviour in the face of the modern world and depending on the events.

When we look at it, the fluctuations in Bosnia and the Balkans are events related to the post-Soviet period. When the developments in the Balkans and other regions are analysed, Russia, which represents the post-Soviet period, continues to support local elements and exhibit attitudes that remind its imperial claim in order not to lose power in the region.

In his article written during the Bosnian War, Charles Krauthammer took the matter a bit further and made a prediction, stating that the possibility of a new Balkan War involving Russia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey could not be ruled out after the UN intervention in the war was delayed[1]. Could it not be considered as an artefact of a similar delay that today the positions and tense postures of Iran, Israel and the USA create fears of such a regional struggle? What is more interesting is that the parties to the event are almost similarly positioned.

Iran’s position in the Syrian conflict should be seen as a situation in which a regional figure is articulated. Continuing on to Bosnia, which we would like to compare with the developments in Syria, on 27th May 1992, 17 civilians were killed and 108 injured in an explosion on Vase Miskin Street in besieged Sarajevo.

Following the deaths of dozens of civilians, British Prime Minister John Major, US President George H. W. Bush, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin and other political leaders immediately blamed the Serbs for this terrible event.

 

As a result, three days later, on May 30, 1992, the UN Security Council agreed to impose a broad economic embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including a ban on oil sales and the cutting off of air links, because of the “Serbian” attack on people waiting for bread[2].

In response to a call by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim leaders for UN intervention, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali told, journalists in Paris that “the proposal to send UN Peacekeeping troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina on the initiative of France will be discussed shortly, but the UN will only send Peacekeeping troops if the international community provides financial and logistical support and the parties involved in the conflict agree to a stable ceasefire[3].

 

In a sense, they were still recognising that Bosnia was a party on equal terms despite the actions of the Serbs and thus basing their intervention perspectives on the norms of international law. As can be seen, at the beginning of the Bosnian incident, the USA, the UK and Turkey were against the Serbs, and the UN’s famous condemnation and embargo practices came into question. This ethnic conflict between Serbs, Bosnians and Croats were realised and ended under the support and shadow of global powers.

While it was the Bosnians’ declaration of independence that sparked the war there in Syria, the reason is, in the crudest analysis, the current regime’s unwillingness to open itself to the people. Of course, the situation in Syria is different.

Instead of the ethnic contradiction in Bosnia, there is a sectarian and to some extent an ethnic contradiction in Syria. However, while the Turkmens, who constitute the ethnic aspect of the event, are in the opposition ranks, the Kurds, for some reason, seem to be silently and deeply armed and waiting for possible and promised days. The purpose here is never to marginalise the Kurdish ethnicity or to show it as a fault line, but to reason on the figures that the imperial mind is likely to use.

Considering only diplomatic approaches to the blood that continues to flow in Syria, the failure of the reflex in Libya for some reason, the deep silence in the Bosnian War, the massacre of the Bosnians who were disarmed, and finally the peace that came to Bosnia within the framework of the maps drawn in three parts; the developments in Syria and the possible western reflexes against it cause concern.

While considering the Syrian issue, of course, Israel’s security concerns in the region should not be ignored. The main concern here is the emergence of surprise maps in Syria as in Bosnia. The historical and current background that will enable this is available.

It is important to take a look at the French colonial period in post-Ottoman Syria in order to understand the historical background. Between 1920 and 1924, the French organised Aleppo, Damascus, Latakia and Jabaal al-Druze into four separate provinces, each with its own government and French advisors. In addition, Iskenderun Sanjak was given a separate autonomous administrative structure. Thus, the Nusayrism (Alawites) in Latakia in the north and the Druze in Jabaal al-Druze in the south had a separate administration. In 1925, France united Damascus and Aleppo into a single Syrian State.

Sunni Muslims constituted the majority in these four provinces, whose borders were redefined by including Hama and Homs. In 1946, the inclusion of Druze and Alawites (Alawites) in the borders of the Syrian State and the disruption of its homogenous structure played an important role in the subsequent instability of Syria[4]. As can be seen, Syria was divided in the colonial period with sectarian considerations at the forefront.

In order to understand the troublesome side of this structuring during the colonial period, it is important to look at the political and administrative structuring in the Mamluk and Ottoman periods in order to make a more consistent comparison and to evaluate the situation in a healthy way.

During the Mameluke and Ottoman periods, Syria was administered mainly by cities and provinces. The administration of the lands in Syria was divided into regencies. The regencies of Damascus, Hama, Hallab, Tripoli and Safed were the main organisation of the Mamlūk administrative division in Syria.

 

In addition, there were smaller administrative structures such as Sis, Kerek, Gaza and Jerusalem[5], Masyaf, Kal’at al-Muslimin, al-Rahbe, al-Bire, Ruha, Shayzer, Ayintāb, Behesni, Malatya, Ayas, Elbistan, Ezene (Adana), Tarsus, Ayas and the regencies of Hallab. Syria was a very important and valuable administrative centre for the Mamluks on their northern borders[6]. After the Sultan in Cairo, the highest ranking and most powerful emir was the regent of Damascus. It is still possible to see the traces of this historical past in Damascus today. The Ottoman provincial organisation consisting of beylerbeyi, sanjak, kaza and nahiyas was applied in this region after the conquest of Damascus (Bilad al-Sham)[7].  After the first victory against the Mamluks, Sultan Salim, I gave the administration of Hallab to Ahmed Bey, known as Karaca Pasha, Hama to Güzelce Kasım Pasha, Hums to İhtimanoğlu, Tripoli to Mustafa Bey, son of İskender Pasha, and the governorship of Damascus to Ahmed Pasha, son of Yahşi. After that, he assigned Gaza to Mehmed Bey son of Isa Bey, Jerusalem to İskender Bey son of Evranos and Safed to Müstansır son.

However, soon afterwards, on 25th  September 1517, he gave the administration of Gaza, Jerusalem and Safed to Canbirdi Ghazali, who entered the Ottoman service after the Battle of Ridaniye, and on  February16, 1518, in addition to these sanjaks, he left the Sanjak of Damascus to Ghazali.

 

Thus, Ghazali became the beylerbeyi of Damascus province under Ottoman rule, as he had been under Mamluk rule. The territory under al-Ghazali’s direct rule was quite extensive and included Safed, Nablus, Jerusalem, Gaza and Kerek-Shebbek in the area from Damascus to Arish.

 

It seems that the Ottoman sultan thought that by appointing al-Ghazali to this position, he would gradually bring the Bedouins under obedience and make the Ottoman rule in this region easy and quick. In fact, Sultan Selim must have had the same thought for Egypt, for he appointed the Mamluk nāyib of Halab, Hayır Bey, who had entered the service of the Ottomans after the battle of Merc-i Dabık, as governor on 29 August 1517.”

The beylerbeydom of Damascus was divided into 18 sanjaks in the most general division after the region was taken from the Mamluks in the 16th century[8]. This division shows great similarities with the Mamlūk period.

During the Ottoman period, the structure of the Mamlūk period was maintained and Syria, which was administered on the basis of sanjaks attached to the Damascus beylerbeylik and later on the basis of provinces and experienced the colonial fragmentation mentioned after the Turkish period and became what it is today.

The division of Syria during the period of Turkish rule, which included the Mamluks and Ottomans, was made with purely administrative considerations, and reflects an understanding in which ethnic and sectarian emphases come to the fore, as in the later period and which does not consider the administration of the region by taking advantage of the contradictions in this sense.

Another aspect of the issue is that an international fragmentation similar to the Bosnian War has also emerged in the Syrian conflict. While Serbs and Croats, the parties of the Bosnian War, were supported by some “big” states, Bosnian Muslims were supported by countries such as Turkey and the USA, as can be seen from the information given in the introduction.

Especially when the position of the Russians, who support the Serbs, is compared to their position in Syria, there is an exemplary situation. Contrary to what was thought, the announcement of this atrocity policy of the Serbs in the world did not increase the hopes of Bosnian to be saved. On the contrary, an embargo was launched with the support of the UN and NATO, especially targeting the Serbs.

However, the Bosnian Serbs were almost unaffected by this embargo, both because of the help of the Russians, the former allies of the Serbs, and because they were geographically more advantageous than the Bosnian Muslims who were further inland. What happened to the Muslims, who were already very weak in terms of weapons and logistics?

Yugoslavia had one of the largest armies in the world, and the Serbs used this power almost to the fullest[9]. today, the Syrian embargo is hitting the opposition. News about shortages of medicine and food have started to circulate.

Russia and, more ironically but strategically, Iran are turning a blind eye to the humanitarian and moral drama unfolding in Syria today in order to preserve a status quo centred on their interests.

This attitude leads to a situation that raises concerns that it will contribute to the process of Banalisation of Syria.

The developments in the context of the Bosnian War and the Arab Spring in Syria are of course not repetitive events. However, some situations and figures within the events have a content that will enable a comparison and evaluations to be made about the future.

 

In addition, it is possible that some of Syria’s past events may carry the clues of potential developments for the future.

Even if it remains purely hypothetical, this look from history to the present on the occasion of this study should be seen as a well-intentioned evaluation effort made from our own point of view to understand the Syrian event and its future.

A comparison of the administrative structure of Syria during the Mamluk and Ottoman Turkish administrations with the division of Syria during the French colonial rule seems to be meaningful for analyses to be made on the future. In today’s unstable situation, there is no reason why similar projects should not be proposed at the UN for the sake of regional and national stability.

The emergence of new Syrian maps at an unexpected moment should not surprise anyone. Weren’t these borders already drawn by someone in the past?

Today, when there are alternative opportunities for those who seek to establish a new status quo in the region through the PYD/PKK-centred structure, concerns about the formation of an unbalanced divided structure in Syria reminiscent of Iraq or Bosnia are not unfounded.

 

The negotiations at the UN, which have become a vicious circle, the condemnation-oriented attitudes of regional and global actors and the current developments in the Middle East feed these concerns.

 

If there are those who think that the de facto situation in Iraq is similar to the current situation in Syria, Turkey and all states in the region should not ignore this situation in an environment where there are conditions for the current situation to be experienced in the historical background of the country as can be seen in the Bosnia example.

 

These predictions, which are hoped not to be realised, should be read as a fire alarm and should not be ignored in the evaluations on Syria, even at a speculative level. In these days when Kofi Annan has been elected as the representative, it is useful to be prepared for unexpected solutions and maps as in Cyprus, in order not to move away from common sense. It is hoped that Syria will overcome these days with the wisdom and determination of Syrians and with a solution that will be good for Syrians.

[1] The,”Doves are Right About Bosnia”. TIME Magazİn, February 8, 1993.

[2] http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosna_Sava%C5%9F%C4%B1-23 February-2012.

[3] Hüseyin Bağcı, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Anlaşmazlıklara Giriş, DTCF Dergisi, Cilt XVI, Sayi 27, Ankara 1994 p.257-279. “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Introduction into the Conflicts After the Cold War,” Publication of Faculty Letters,Ankara University, D.T.C.F.Journal, Vol. XVl, Number 27, Ankara,1995, p. 259.

[4] Tayyar Arı, Middle East, Bursa, 2008, p.160.

[5] el-Kalkaşandî, Ebu el-Abbâs Ahmed b. Ali, Subh el-‘Aşâ fi Sinâ’at el-İnşâ, (Tah.Muhammed Hüseyin Şemseddin), v.4, Beyrut,1987,p.206.

[6] el-Kalkaşandî, Subh, v.4, p. 235, v.9, p.253.

[7] Enver Çakar, “XVI. Yüzyılda Şam Beylerbeyliğinin İdarî Taksimatı”, Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, v.13, p.1, 2003, p.352.

[8] Çakar, op. cit., p.356, 366-373.

[9] http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosna_Soyk%C4%B1r%C4%B1m%C4%B1-23-February-2012.

Prof Dr Altan Çetin

Prof Dr Altan Çetin

Anadolu University

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